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The Persistent Problem: Inequality, Difference, 
and the Challenge of Development
Report of the Task Force on Difference, Inequality,  
and Developing Societies
Why should we be concerned with inequality in a world where economic growth has created unprecedented abundance? The per capita income of 
the United States is 64 times that of the world’s poorest country, and the income 
of the richest 1% is 415 times the income of the poorest 1%. This report shows 
that these vast inequalities are a persistent problem because they enable powerful 
countries to shape global markets in ways that limit benefits to poor countries, and 
they empower elites in poor countries to resist changes that improve social welfare.
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Executive Summary
This report highlights the complex, multidimensional nature of inequality in the era of 
globalization.  It documents that despite the impressive strides by nations like China 
and India, absolute inequality between the richest and poorest countries is greater than 
ever before in history.  It demonstrates that the rise of China and India creates a new 
dimension to the persistent problem of inequality.  
This report’s central argument is that, under conditions of high inequality, 
elites—both international and within individual nations—may create socially 
suboptimal institutions and policies, and they may resist changes that promote 
development but threaten their dominance. The high levels of inequality documented 
here pose a persistent problem for the world. The problem manifests itself in three 
major ways:
l.  International economic inequality enables powerful countries to shape 
the growth of global markets in ways that limit the benefits globalization 
might deliver to poorer countries. Similarly, capital flows are shaped in 
ways that disadvantage poorer nations while increasing the frequency of 
financial crises.
2.  Economic inequality within developing countries often enables elites to 
establish policies and institutions yielding patterns of development that 
disproportionately favor their own interests. Domestic inequality also 
allows them to resist useful institutional changes.
3.  Inequality of status within nations may produce hierarchies that 
empower elites to establish institutions that discriminate against, and 
marginalize, weaker groups, often provoking resistance that promotes 
violent conflict.
The problem of inequality will become more urgent as rapidly improving 
communications and transportation technologies increase people’s awareness of it.  We 
conclude there are no universal policy prescriptions.  In an increasingly interdependent 
world, international institutions should be made more accountable to poor countries 
if they are to maintain their legitimacy and effectiveness .  Democracy and capitalism 
offer the promise of alleviating the problems of inequality in developing countries, 
but they flourish best only if the peoples of those nations can develop economic 
and political institutions that reflect their own histories and cultures. In developed 
countries, policymakers and citizens must learn more about the distinctive conditions 
in each developing country; their ability to help remedy inequalities depends on 
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listening to and engaging with social and political goals formulated by actors within 
those countries. Effective change will be interactive, not imposed.
The report first discusses measures of global inequality, and then examines how 
international inequality has shaped the world trade regime and financial markets 
in ways that diminish potential benefits to weaker nations. Next it explains how 
inequalities within developing countries often warp or diminish economic and 
infrastructure development, limiting benefits to the poor. Then the report looks at ways 
in which hierarchies of status produce discrimination, marginalization, and outbreaks 
of violent conflict within developing nations. Finally, it concludes with issues and 
institutions to re-examine in order to overcome persistent inequalities. 
The report first points out disturbing global trends:
n Inequality between the United States and the world’s poorest country, in 
terms of per capita income, rose from 38.5 to 1 in 1960 to 64 to 1 in 2005.
n In 2000, the wealthiest 1% percent of the world’s people earned 415 times 
more than the earnings of the poorest 1%—up from 216 times in 1980, 
despite hurtling advances by a few nations.
n The global distribution of household wealth is even more unequal. In 2000, 
the top 10% of adults (over age 20) in the world owned 85% of such wealth, 
while the bottom half owned barely 1%.
n From the 1960s to 1990s, domestic income inequality rose in 65% of 
developing countries, declining in only 13%.
n A population-weighted measure of each nation’s GDP comfortingly 
registers a small decline in inequality in the world from 1967 to 2000. In 
truth, the entire decline this measure records is due to China’s economic 
miracle.  Among the rest of the countries of the world, the trend is toward 
greater inequality.
n A recent World Bank study warns that only one of the eight Millennium 
Development Goals it set—that of halving poverty—will be achieved. The 
failure of wealthy nations to fulfill their commitments to fund foreign 
assistance will be a key factor if this occurs. 
The world trade regime and capital flows show marked inequalities. The huge 
markets of the U.S. and the European Union give them disproportionate leverage. 
Being excluded from these markets can be devastating for most developing nations, 
while exclusion from developing markets means little to the U.S. or Europe.  Wealthy 
countries have used their power to reap benefits at the expense of the poorest 
countries.   At the same time, globalization has given rise to a new economic 
geography characterized by an upper tier of emerging markets whose economies 
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are are more globally competitive.  Will the growing power of countries like Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China (the “BRICs”) benefit poorer countries or will it lead to new 
inequities?  Specific findings include: 
n Though developing countries account for less than one-third of imports by 
developed countries, they pay two-thirds of their tariffs. On average, the U.S. 
has imposed tariffs on imports from developing countries more than three 
times higher than those on imports from developed nations. For the poorest 
countries, U.S. tariffs are more than 10 times higher than tariffs for wealthy 
OECD nations.
n Agricultural subsidies of rich nations surpass the entire GDP of sub-
Saharan Africa, and they amount to six times all foreign aid from rich 
nations. European cows, each with an implicit income of $2.50 a day from 
subsidies, have higher incomes than one-third of the world’s people.
n Under the new regime for intellectual property rights that was created with 
the founding of the WTO, 96% of all patent revenues from developing 
countries go to firms from developed countries.  These firms are far more 
likely to invest these funds to satisfy demand in markets like the United 
States where health care spending is $4,000 per person than in sub-Saharan 
Africa where health expenditures are just $20 per person.
n In the 1990s, just six Asian countries plus Mexico accounted for 63.5% of 
all manufacturing exports from the developing world, even though these 
countries contain less than 29% of the developing world’s population.
n Just 11 nations—with 35% of the developing world’s population—received 
75% of all foreign direct investment in the 1990s. More recently, Asian 
nations’ FDI share has grown from 23% in 1980 to 62% in 2005, while Latin 
America’s share dropped from 67% to 25%.
n The BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India and China—now comprise more than one-
fourth of world GDP and they are 4 of the world’s 10 largest economies.
n Chinese investments in Africa are overwhelmingly in extractive industries.  
African exports to China have grown tenfold since 1995, but they are 
predominantly primary commodities.
The report next examines how domestic inequalities affect the politics of 
economic development, with sidebars on India and China. Very great inequalities 
diminish growth by making property rights less secure, reducing incentives for those 
at the bottom of the social hierarchy, and hindering efficient operation of labor, capital 
and product markets. In the past 30 years, the world has seen a dramatic spread of 
democratically elected governments, from 39 in 1974 to 122 in 2005. Yet domestic 
inequality has grown in most developing nations. Why? Some findings:
n Economic crises, often caused by greater exposure to international markets, 
cause greater inequality in developing nations. Poor nations are obliged to 
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undertake austerity measures that reduce social benefits, while their wealthy 
disproportionately benefit from fiscal bailouts.
n Though many developing countries adopt the trappings of democracy, 
the quality of their democratic process has been poor.  Of nearly 100 such 
countries considered in transition to democracy, less than 20 are clearly en 
route to becoming well-functioning democracies.
n Inequalities cumulate and create the most formidable challenges for 
those least capable of surmounting them.  Lower caste women and female 
children in India’s poorest state of Bihar are not only the least educated 
(female literacy rates in some districts are below 3%) but also the most 
malnourished.
n Economic liberalization has coincided with an increase in economic 
insecurity in many developing countries.   One manifestation of this is that 
the share of workers in the informal economy—where employment is casual 
and work conditions are not subject to safety and health protections—has 
grown in Africa, Latin America and Asia.  In Africa, 90% of new employment 
was in the informal sector during the 1980s and 1990s.  In Latin America, 
the figure was 80%.
Next, the report focuses on how developing nations meet the formidable challenge 
of their social differences. Many nations must democratize while nation-building, and 
they have often inherited colonial-era boundaries fashioned more for administrators’ 
convenience than demographic reality. The political demands of historically 
marginalized groups present democratic political systems with what has been called 
“the post-liberal challenge” to traditional assimilationist policies. The myth of 
“primordial” ethnic conflict has been exposed by recent studies, which find that peaceful 
relations are more characteristic of societies with greater ethnic diversity, providing the 
government is strong and intent on averting conflict rather than weak and controlled by 
leaders who stir up ethnic conflict for political advantage. That said, violence is a major 
obstacle to economic advancement:
n Low-income nations are 15 times likelier to have violent civil conflict than 
the richest countries.
n A significant positive relationship exists between income inequality and 
violent crime, even after controlling for other causes of crime. A recent 
World Bank survey of people in developing countries found that, in the 
minds of the poor, physical insecurity is a more serious problem than 
poverty.
n Truth and reconciliation commissions in several countries identified 
economic inequality and political exclusion as major factors promoting 
cycles of political violence and repression. Studies show that absolute 
poverty and inequality are correlated with high levels of repression.
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n Violence in the world’s 52 poorest nations reduced their average per capita 
growth rate by 2.4% each year. 
n Participatory democracy facilitates building good institutions that 
contribute to higher quality economic growth – growth that is less volatile, 
better able to adjust to shocks, and which produces superior distributional 
outcomes. 
In conclusion, the report suggests issues and institutions to examine in 
overcoming persistent inequalities at a time when global differences, increasingly visible 
to people throughout the world, call into question the legitimacy of international 
institutions. Among these issues and institutions are:
n The World Trade Organization process, TRIPs, tariffs and subsidies in 
wealthy countries.
n Excessively restrictive bilateral and regional trade agreements. 
n Carefully liberalizing barriers to international labor markets.
n Capital account liberalization that takes account of distinctive conditions in 
LDCs, especially their poorly-developed regulatory institutions.
n Reforming market reforms in developing countries that promote elite 
interests without improving economic welfare and security for the whole 
society.
n The important role in achieving high quality economic growth in poor 
countries played by more participatory and accountable democratic 
institutions through their more equitable enforcement of the rule of 
law, political and property rights, civil liberties and their more equitable 
investments in human and physical capital.
n More sophisticated attention by developed nations to differences among 
LDC societies, cultures, and government structures in framing aid and 
investment policy.
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Inequality, Difference, and the Challenge of Development
I. Introduction:  Inequality in a World of Promise 
Conditions for alleviating deprivation in the world are more favorable than ever before. 
Economic growth, producing a $55 trillion economy, has improved the lives of millions. 
Growth has accelerated since 2002. From 2003 to 2006, the average annual rate of real 
economic growth for developing countries was 6.2%, up from a 3.6% annual average for 
the previous five years. Poor countries like China, South Korea, and India have achieved 
spectacular rates of growth and substantially reduced poverty. Agreements on the eight 
U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and debt relief mark an unprecedented 
consensus among wealthy countries to provide coordinated foreign assistance to the 
world’s poorest countries. The spread of democracy throughout the world offers the basis 
for improved governance.
Inequality and difference pose relentless challenges in this world of promise. Consider 
the limited progress toward reaching the MDGs. A recent World Bank study warned that 
only one of the eight goals—that of halving poverty—will be achieved.1  The failure of 
wealthy countries to fulfill their commitments to fund foreign assistance to poor countries 
will be an important factor if this disappointing outcome materializes. The inability of 
poor countries to meet commitments to their own poor will be another significant factor. 
In other words, our efforts to reach the MDGs may fall short because they do not account 
for the power asymmetries that result from economic and social inequalities.
This report defines inequality in terms of persistent disparities in incomes of 
people, though inequalities in assets, health, and education are also important factors 
in shaping political and economic outcomes. Difference refers to variation in social 
status and other distinguishing features of peoples and societies—language, religion, 
ethnicity, gender, and cultural practices.
The report is concerned with the consequences of inequality for economic and 
political development. It demonstrates that high levels of economic or status inequality 
can enable powerful actors to produce institutions and policies that reduce the potential 
benefits to others while reinforcing their position of dominance. The argument here is 
not that inequality is always incompatible with economic growth. There are many cases 
where countries with high inequality have experienced high levels of economic growth. Nor 
does the report make a normative argument against all forms of inequality, though there 
are powerful normative arguments against high levels of inequality that institutionalize 
privilege. The central argument of this report is that under conditions of high inequality, 
elites may create socially suboptimal institutions and policies, and they may subsequently 
resist changes that promote development but threaten their dominance.
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A proper understanding of inequality can take us beyond sterile “state vs. market” 
dichotomies where analysts only advocate for more of one or the other. Markets 
develop along different trajectories. An emphasis on inequality helps us to understand 
why markets may develop in ways that diminish their potential benefits for the poor.
Issues of difference play two important roles in our analysis. First, the increasing 
interdependence of people around the world makes it more important than ever for 
analysts and practitioners in developed countries to be alert to cultural differences and 
the distinctiveness of social processes in developing countries. Yet, global inequalities 
often enable powerful actors to impose world views, institutions, and policy 
prescriptions that slight important differences among societies. These impositions 
limit the progress of people in the less powerful countries around the world. 
Secondly, accommodating social difference presents a formidable challenge to the 
efforts of developing societies to achieve social equity, domestic peace, and economic 
security. When differences are ranked into hierarchies, they become associated with 
inequalities of power. All too often they result in policies and institutions that produce 
discrimination, marginalization, and in extreme cases, violent conflict.
When hierarchies of inequality and difference shape political and economic 
institutions, social outcomes may reproduce or increase existing inequalities. Figure 1 
depicts what can happen in such scenarios. This report highlights that patterns of 
persistence and change can be found in a range of circumstances that have a profound 
impact on developing countries. Its three key findings are:
High 
economic 
inequality
Patterns of Policy 
& Institutional 
Persistance & 
Change
Social outcomes 
that may reproduce 
or increase existing 
inequalities
Social 
Status 
Hierarchy
Unequal voice in 
decision-making
Discrimination,
Marginalization,
Violent Conict
Figure 1: Inequality, Social Hierarchy, and the Persistence of Inequality
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1.  International economic inequality has enabled powerful countries to 
shape the development of global markets in ways that limit the benefits 
globalization can deliver to developing countries. This observation is not 
an argument against globalization, rather it is a finding that the particular 
trajectory globalization has followed has been shaped by political processes 
that favor wealthy countries while diminishing the potential benefits to poor 
countries. While some developing countries—for instance China and India—
have achieved substantial benefits, the poorest countries have missed out the 
most. The challenge is to create an economic order that does not leave the 
weakest countries behind.
2.  Economic inequality within developing countries often enables elites to 
establish policies and institutions that produce patterns of development 
disproportionately favoring their interests. It enables elites to resist changes 
that enhance development and social welfare but threaten their interests. 
This is an especially important problem in an era where globalization, rapidly 
changing circumstances, and technological innovation require frequent 
modification of policies and institutions to maintain economic dynamism.
3. Status inequality can lead to policies and institutions that discriminate 
against weaker groups, marginalize them, and provoke resistance 
that gives rise to violent civil conflict. This outcome is not only morally 
undesirable, but can also retard development and diminish social welfare.
The report begins by discussing measures of global inequality and documenting 
that it remains a serious problem. Next, the report examines how international 
inequality has enabled powerful countries to shape the development of global markets 
in ways that diminish potential benefits to weaker countries. It then investigates the 
circumstances in which economic inequalities within developing countries can diminish 
economic development and limit the benefits to the poor. Then, it assesses the ways in 
which status hierarchies result in discrimination, marginalization, and the outbreak of 
violent civil conflict. Finally, it concludes with some speculation about improving the 
quality of democracy as a means of alleviating the negative consequences of inequality 
for development and violent conflict.
II. What We Know About Global Inequalities
The assumption of social progress is fundamental to the modern era, and many 
contend that the era of expanding global markets should be particularly beneficial for 
developing countries.  There have been remarkable improvements in health and education 
throughout the world since the early nineteenth century, and the share of the world’s 
people living in poverty has declined.  However, economic growth among countries 
has been more uneven than what is widely recognized, and global income inequality 
has been more persistent at very high levels. This section examines two vital issues: 
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First, it documents that income inequalities among the peoples and countries of the 
world remain at historically high levels. It also demonstrates that many of the positive 
developments in regard to global inequality in 
recent years are in large measure a consequence of 
the remarkable economic progress of two immense 
countries, China and India. The rise of these giants 
introduces a second vital but underappreciated issue: the extent to which economic 
progress among developing countries is uneven. While China and India—and East Asia 
more generally—have achieved historic progress, economic development in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Latin America, and the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
has been disappointing.
Global inequality—a direct measure of interpersonal income disparities throughout 
the world—continues at historically elevated levels. From 1820 to 1992, the Theil index, a 
decomposable measure of inequality, increased from 0.522 to 0.855 (see Figure 2).2  The 
most important factor driving this increase is inequality between countries.  Meanwhile, 
inequality within countries rose slightly from 1820 to 1910. It declined in the following 
60 years with the most substantial declines occurring during the period of the Great 
Depression and World War II. It has gradually increased since 1970.
0
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0.5
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0.7
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Source: Francis Bourguignon and Christian Morrisson, "Inequality among World Citizens: 1820-1992," The American Economic Review 92:4 
(September 2002), 734.
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Figure 2: Historical Trends in Global Inequality, 1820-1992
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Different measures of inequality in the world highlight different developments. 
When we measure inequality as differences in the per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) of each of the world’s countries and treat each country as an equal unit, we find that 
...income inequalities among the 
peoples and countries of the world 
remain at historically high levels...
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inequality in the world has steadily increased since the early 1980s from a Gini coefficient 
of 0.473 in 1982 to 0.545 in 2000 (see Figure 3). When we take each country’s per capita 
GDP and weight it by the country’s population, there is a different trend: inequality in the 
world has steadily declined from a Gini coefficient of 0.559 in 1967 to 0.502 in 2000.
These different measures of inequality have different uses. The first measure 
demonstrates the consequences of different countries’ economic policies. The second 
measure weights each country’s per capita GDP by population in order to provide a 
more accurate description of the overall impact of recent trends on people around the 
world. When we look more closely at this population-weighted measure of inequality, it 
reveals a very important development. All of the decline in inequality recorded by this 
measure is accounted for by China’s economic miracle. The trend among all the other 
countries of the world, not including China, is for increasing inequality.
Because per capita GDP is a national average, measuring inequality by comparing 
trends in population-weighted GDP per capita among the world’s countries understates 
the amount of inequality in the world because it does not include inequality within 
countries. Virtually all studies of global inequality among individuals since 1980 find that 
inequality ranges between Gini coefficients of 0.61 
and 0.68.3 This is a staggering level of inequality. If 
the world were a country, it would rank near the very 
bottom of a list of the most unequal countries.
Source: Branko Milanovic Powerpoint presentation at the Ralph Miliband Memorial Lecture at the London School of Economics, 
February 2005, available at http://web.worldbank.org.
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Figure 3: International Inequality Measured by Gini Coecients, 1950-2000
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Income Polarization. In the past 40 years, there has been a marked polarization 
of income distribution in the world. Inequality between the United States—the world’s 
wealthiest country—and the world’s poorest country in terms of Gross National 
Product (GNP) per capita calculated in purchasing 
power parity dollars has risen from an already 
large 38.5:1 in 1960 to more than 64:1 in 2005 
(see Figure 4).4 Moreover, economic growth 
during the 1990s has benefited the wealthy 
disproportionately. Consumption by the richest 20%, which includes 95% of the people 
in developed countries, accounted for two-thirds of the world’s total while the bottom 
50% got only 9.5% of increased consumption.5 Finally, there are wide disparities at the 
extremes of global income distribution among individuals that have reached historically 
unprecedented levels. In 1980, the richest 1% of the world population earned 216 times 
the poorest 1%. By 2000, this enormous gap had ballooned to 415 times the earnings of 
the poorest 1%.6
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Figure 4: International Income Polarization in PPP$, 1960-2005
Household Wealth. The global distribution of household wealth—defined in terms 
of net worth of adults over age 20 and calculated in terms of official exchange rates—is 
even more unequal. In 2000, its Gini coefficient was 0.892.7  The top 10% of adults in 
the world owned 85% of global household wealth while the bottom half owned barely 
In the past 40 years, there has been 
a marked polarization of income 
distribution in the world.
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1%. The average net worth per adult is $153,874 
in 24 high income OECD countries (see Figure 5). 
This is 79 times greater than the $1,950 average for 
64 low income countries.8
Figure 5: Net Wealth Per Adult in 2000 (At Ocial Exchange Rate Valuations, in US Dollars)
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New Inequalities Among Developing Countries. Creating the category “developing 
countries” was always a problematic exercise in concept stretching. If these societies, 
with their remarkable variations in social organization and history, ever had anything 
in common, it was a negative identity delimited in reference to the developed and 
communist countries. The disparate economic conditions characterizing wealthy and 
poorer economies created a perspective that made it sensible to group these diverse 
societies together in a single category. However, the concept obscures the differential 
dynamism among developing countries in recent years.
Consider this: in terms of 2005, Brazil’s per capita Gross National Income, (measured 
by purchasing power parity dollars, or PPP) is more than 12 times greater than that 
of Malawi—the world’s poorest country—but it is only five times less than that of the 
United States. China’s per capita income is more than 10 times greater than Malawi’s 
but only 6.4 times less than the United States.9  Asia’s economic success underpins the 
In 2000 . . .  the top 10% of adults 
in the world owned 85% of global 
household wealth while the bottom 
half owned barely 1%.
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dynamics of many important changes. There have always been such disparities among 
countries classified as developing, but Asia’s accelerated economic growth may generate 
new inequalities among developing countries. From 1997–2006, East Asia grew at an 
average annual rate of 6.3%, driven in considerable measure by China’s 9.1% growth rate. 
South Asia grew at 5.5%, thanks in part to India’s 6.2% rate of growth. In contrast, Africa 
and West Asia’s growth rates were an identical 4.0%. The transition economies grew at 
an annual rate of 4.9%. Latin America and the Caribbean were the poorest performing 
regions with an average annual growth rate of just 2.9%.10 
Asia’s economic dynamism is also apparent in the diverse regional trends in 
poverty alleviation (see Figure 6). The total number of people living in absolute poverty 
—those with daily incomes less than 
one dollar—declined by 501 million 
from 1,470 million in 1980 to 969 
million in 2004. However, without the 
627 million drop in East Asia (China 
alone had a 506 million decline), the number of people living in poverty in the rest 
of the developing world increased by 581 million. The largest proportional increases 
occurred in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. In the transitional 
economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the number of people living in absolute 
poverty grew by more than five times from 3.1 million to 17 million. In sub-Saharan 
Africa the number of people in absolute poverty almost doubled from 164 million to 
313 million. People living in poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean grew by 40% 
from 35.6 million to 49.8 million.11 
Without the 627 million drop in East Asia (China 
alone had a 506 million decline), the number 
of people living in poverty in the rest of the 
developing world increased by 581 million.
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There are many explanations for the regional differences in economic 
development. An important factor is that the benefits of global trade and finance 
have been concentrated in a limited number of countries. Success in manufacturing 
exports has varied dramatically. During the 1990s, just six Asian countries and Mexico 
accounted for 63.5% of all manufacturing exports from the developing world even 
though those countries contained less than 29% of the people (see Figure 7). Many 
of the least developed countries experienced a decline in their share of world markets 
despite having implemented measures to liberalize trade.12
Capital flows to developing countries were also highly concentrated. From 
1990–1999, just 11 countries—with 35% of the developing country population—
received 75% of all Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to developing countries while the 
other 176 developing countries received only 25%. In 2005, 10 countries accounted for 
65% of FDI. Asian countries received the lion’s share of FDI in recent years, and their 
share of total FDI stock in developing countries has grown from 23% in 1980 to 62% 
in 2005. At the same time, Latin America’s share dropped from 67% to 25%.13 Portfolio 
equity flows were also highly concentrated. Of the estimated $94 billion in portfolio 
Source: World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All (Geneva: 
International Labour Organization, 2004), 26.
Figure 7: Distribution of Manufacturing Exports from Developing Countries, 1990-1999
180 other 
developing 
countries, 
36.50%
China (including Hong 
Kong), 15.20%
Rep of Korea
11.70%
Taiwan, 11.20%
Singapore, 9.40%
Mexico, 7%
Malaysia, 5%
Thailand, 4%
16 APSA   •   The Persistent Problem: Inequality, Difference, and the Challenge of Development
equity flows to developing countries in 2005, the 
top five countries received more than 74%. Asia 
received 70% of these flows. The top 10 countries 
issued 70% of developing country bonds, and 70% 
of all bank lending to developing countries was 
received by only 10 countries. These categories of 
capital flows were not favored by Asian countries.14
Despite the financial crisis of 1997–1998, East Asian capital markets have achieved 
a much higher level of development than those in other regions. In 2004, stock market 
capitalization for East Asian countries was a striking 146% of GDP—exceeding the 94% 
ratio for the G7 countries—while stock market capitalization to GDP for Latin America 
was only 43%. The current value traded on East Asia’s stock exchanges was 105% of GDP 
in 2004 while the figure for Latin America was just 6.1%. East Asian debt markets are 
also more developed. The share of GDP accounted for by private sector domestic bonds 
was 36.3% for East Asia compared to 10.7% for Latin America. Financial sector credit to 
Figure 8: Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment Inows to Developing Countries,1990-1999 
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Of the estimated $94 billion in 
portfolio equity flows to developing 
countries in 2005, the top five 
countries received more than 74%.
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the private sector as a share of GDP in 2004 was 75.7% for East Asia and only 10.7% for 
Latin America.15 
The trajectory of globalization is creating a new economic geography characterized 
by increasing economic linkages among developing countries and the development of 
an upper tier of emerging markets whose economies are more globally competitive than 
other developing countries. Merchandise trade among developing countries has grown 
twice as fast as world trade over the past decade.16  FDI from one developing country to 
another has grown rapidly in recent years. Excluding investment from offshore financial 
centers, “South-South” FDI grew from just $2 billion in 1985 to $60 billion in 2004.17  
In 2005, of the 77,000 transnational corporations in the world, more than 20,000 were 
from developing countries.18  Many of them have a substantial share of their operations 
in other developing countries.
Amid the disparate success and growing inequality among developing countries, 
an upper tier has emerged that exercises growing influence in the development of global 
markets. The BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—now account for more than 
one-fourth of the world’s GDP in purchasing 
power parity terms, up from 17% in 1990. They 
comprise four of the 10 largest economies in 
the world.19  Together, they contributed more 
than 35% of world growth from 2000–2005. 
Their economies are increasingly integrated 
with global markets. Total trade in goods and 
services amounted to two-thirds of China’s GDP, 56% of Russia’s, 40% of India’s, and 
32% of Brazil’s, compared to a 42% average for OECD countries.20  According to one 
prediction, if the four BRICs sustain policies supportive of growth, they will comprise 
four of the world’s six largest economies by 2050.21 
The rise of the BRICs—along with other upper tier emerging markets such as 
the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, etc.—has established new inequalities 
that pose challenges for the poorest developing countries. Labor-intensive industry 
from Asia is a serious threat to light industry in Africa and Latin America. While Asian 
countries have a strong interest in reducing tariffs on light industry, such measures 
would undercut efforts to promote labor-intensive industry in Africa and Latin 
America. They might even undermine efforts to promote industrial development 
through preferential agreements, such as the EU’s Everything But Arms Initiative and 
the United States’ African Growth and Opportunities Act.22  On the other hand, Brazil 
has the third largest agro-industry sector in the world. Should tariffs on agricultural 
goods be sufficiently lowered, Brazil’s competitive advantage would greatly diminish 
opportunities for agricultural exports from poor countries even where the EU has 
given them tariff-free access.23 
The rise of the BRICs provides opportunities as well as challenges for poorer 
developing countries. Their rapid growth offers expanding markets, and their 
The BRICs—Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China—now comprise more 
than one-fourth of the world’s GDP... 
They comprise four of the 10 largest 
economies in the world.
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increasing FDI and foreign assistance may accelerate the development of poor 
countries. Conceivably, the BRICs might be more sympathetic to the plight of the 
poorest countries than advanced industrial countries. Their growing power might 
shape globalization in ways that help to alleviate some of the problems of the poorer 
developing countries. However, the economic relations emerging between Asia and 
Africa have elements—Asia exports industrial goods and higher value-added services 
while Africa exports raw materials—that reinforce asymmetries. It would be a mistake 
to simply equate the interests of the upper tier of emerging markets with the interests 
of poorer developing countries. Whether the emergence of the BRICs leads to a more 
benign or challenging environment for the development of the poorest developing 
countries remains to be seen. What is clear is that the rise of the BRICS will be an 
important factor shaping the development of global markets for years to come.
Accelerated Growth but the Persistent Challenge. In recent years, economic growth 
in developing countries has accelerated. An especially hopeful sign is that in the world’s 
poorest countries grew at a 7.4% annual rate from 2003 to 2006. Improved terms of 
trade for primary commodities since 2002 is a major factor contributing to accelerating 
growth in developing countries. From 2002 through to October 2006, the combined 
index for commodity prices rose by 95%. Minerals and metals along with crude 
petroleum led the way with increases of 246% and 170% respectively.24  Another key 
factor that contributed to the improved performance of the poorest countries was that 
wealthy countries agreed to provide them with a significant amount of debt relief while 
increasing foreign aid and taking measures to improve aid effectiveness. The governance 
of many developing countries has improved, and the macroeconomic policy of many 
countries is managed with greater expertise.
Can poor countries take advantage of this favorable environment to sustain this 
accelerated growth? To do so, they will need to diversify their economies so that they 
are less reliant on primary commodity exports. Inequalities at both the international 
and domestic levels make this particularly challenging. At the international level, biases 
against the poorest countries in terms of manufacturers and agricultural goods are 
impediments into more diversified growth. Poor countries need policy space to devise 
developmental strategies that are appropriate to their distinctive circumstances, but 
agreements at the WTO on trade-related property rights and trade-related investment 
measures, among others, limit their policy space. In order to insulate themselves from 
global financial turbulence, developing countries have accumulated more than $3 trillion 
in foreign reserves. They have experienced negative net financial transfers in every year 
of the last decade with the outflows from transition and developing countries estimated 
to total more than $600 billion in 2006.25  Finally, the success of China, India, and other 
Asian low-wage economies makes the traditional route of diversifying through labor-
intensive industry much more challenging for other developing areas since China and 
India’s wages are lower and their labor more productive than those in most other poor 
countries. At the domestic level, diversified development needs extensive infrastructural 
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development, but political inequalities can limit investment and cause neglect of areas 
without political clout. Investment in human capital is key to promoting economic 
development, but inequalities often result in the relative neglect of primary and 
secondary education for non-elites. Adequate social safety nets facilitate the otherwise 
Africa: The Challenges of Global and Domestic Inequality
Africa includes many of the world’s poorest countries and neediest people, and the 
acceleration of its economic growth from an annual average of 3.3% from 1997–2002 
to 5.1% from 2003–2006 promises to improve the conditions of many.26  Better 
macroeconomic management, debt relief, and increased foreign assistance have 
played an important role in the region’s higher growth rates. The most important 
factor has been an increased demand for key African export commodities, especially 
crude oil, metals, and minerals.
The higher rates of growth remain inadequate to meet the U.N. Millennium 
Development Goals for the region, and Africa must overcome a number of obstacles 
to achieve the level of development necessary to meet these goals. Domestic 
investment rates in sub-Saharan Africa are below the levels in other developing 
regions. From 2000–2004, domestic investment as a share of GDP was only 18% 
in sub-Saharan Africa compared to 31% in East Asia and the Pacific.27  Inadequate 
investment has left the region with a poor infrastructure. Sub-Saharan Africa has 
a road density of less than 7 km/100 miles, compared to 18 km for Asia and 12 km 
for Latin America. Electric power consumption is only 457 kilowatts per person in 
sub-Saharan Africa compared to 891 in East Asia and the Pacific and 1,506 in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The region has only 15 telephone mainlines per 1,000 
people compared to 131 in East Asia and the Pacific and 169 in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Public health services in many African countries is woefully inadequate at 
a time when an HIV/AIDs pandemic is devastating their workforce. The recent surge 
in economic growth has generated few new jobs because much of the growth is in 
capital-intensive oil production and mining while labor-intensive industries have not 
fared well against international competition.28 
China’s presence as a trading partner, investor, and donor of foreign assistance has 
grown rapidly in recent years. African exports to China have increased more than 
10-fold since 1995. Its exports are overwhelmingly primary commodities while it 
imports largely labor-intensive manufactures. China contributes funds for large 
infrastructural projects designed to increase the export of raw materials. African 
industry is unable to compete with cheap Chinese manufactures whose success has 
restricted Africa’s industrial job creation. The developmental impact of Chinese firms 
in Africa is also limited by the firms’ preference for Chinese managers. The Economic 
Commission for Africa cites concerns that Chinese firms do not protect workers’ rights 
or the environment.29 
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painful structural adjustments that are part of global integration, but inequalities limit 
their funding and tend to concentrate their benefits to the neglect of the neediest sectors.
III. Inequality, Difference, and the Politics of Global Markets
Political scientists studying the development of markets for global trade and finance 
have generated important insights about the evolution of international economic 
governance since World War II. The politics of international markets has created an 
institutional framework that favors wealthy countries, often to the disadvantage of 
poor ones. This section discusses the evolution of global markets for trade and finance. 
Each sub-section begins by illuminating how economic and political inequalities 
have shaped the evolution of markets. They then investigate how global markets have 
operated to reinforce global inequalities.
Global Trade in an Unequal World. The most important wellspring of power for 
wealthy countries is the immense size of their markets.30  Simply put, being excluded 
from the giant markets of the United States and European Union can be devastating for 
most developing countries, while being excluded from the market of most developing 
countries is of little consequence for the United States and other wealthy countries. 
This reality provides the United States and Europe with enormous leverage in trade 
negotiations. It also creates disparities in the enforcement of WTO rulings. When the 
WTO decides a country has broken its rules, it authorizes the plaintiff country to levy 
sanctions that reduce access to its market. When the U.S. takes such measures, it can 
be disastrous for developing countries. When Antigua won a ruling against the U.S., it 
could not enforce it because placing tariffs on American goods would merely raise prices 
for Antiguans while having virtually no impact on the U.S.
Institutions and Power Disparities. Wealthy countries have repeatedly used their power 
to ensure that the institutional forums where the rules of international trade are determined 
were favorable to their interests. When poor countries put up too much resistance, wealthy 
countries have shifted negotiations to new institutional arenas. In 1948, the United States 
Congress rejected the charter creating the International Trade Organization as a forum 
for negotiating the post-war trade regime and obliged the world to utilize the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to promote international trade even though the 
GATT had been ratified by only 23 signatories, all wealthy countries. Similarly, after efforts 
to establish new provisions for trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs), trade-
related investment measures (TRIMs), and the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) were resisted by developing countries during the Uruguay Round of the GATT, 
the U.S. and other wealthy countries created the World Trade Organization as a “single 
undertaking” that defined TRIPs, TRIMs, and the GATS as “integral parts” that were 
binding on all members. As a result, developing countries were obliged to choose between 
remaining outside the WTO and therefore having restricted access to the world’s largest 
markets, or joining the WTO and accepting provisions for TRIPs, TRIMs, and the GATs.
 Task Force Report on Difference, Inequality, and Developing Societies 21
The WTO Process 
Wealthy countries shape the WTO’s multilateral negotiating process to enhance their 
ability to achieve their objectives, though their efforts have been affected by the 
changing balance of power.31  Initial negotiations at the WTO are open to proposals 
from all parties. However, the proposals that reach the final round overwhelmingly 
come from Washington or Brussels. In the United States, the government has 
institutionalized a channel for the participation of large corporations, and the 
private sector in the United States plays a crucial role in developing many American 
negotiating initiatives. This is best illustrated by the central role of large American 
pharmaceutical companies in developing provisions for TRIPs.32  
Delegates play a much more active role in a “member-driven organization” like the 
WTO than at other “staff-driven” international institutions.33 During negotiations, 
wealthy countries are represented by teams of experienced civil servants, supported 
by expert private sector consultants, while only a handful of inexperienced 
civil servants with limited expertise represent developing countries. According 
to knowledgeable observers, “the increasing complexity and breadth of the 
negotiations [at the WTO]—many of which take place simultaneously, especially 
during the crucial final days of negotiations—make it all but impossible for the 
majority of developing countries to attend all the sessions, let alone negotiate on 
a fully informed and capable basis.”34  In serving to mediate negotiations, the WTO 
secretariat is more representative of the interests of developed countries, according 
to Richard Steinberg, because it works under the “shadow of power” cast by wealthy 
countries and because it is overwhelmingly staffed by experts from these countries.35  
During the sixty-year history of the GATT and WTO, all but one Director-General have 
been from developed countries.  
In the wake of the breakdown of negotiations in Seattle in 1999, WTO members 
agreed at the ministerial meetings in Doha to launch a “developmental” round of 
negotiations that would address issues of concern to poor countries. Doha round 
negotiations reflect the difficulties wealthy countries encounter as the balance of 
power at the WTO begins to change.36  Progress has been impeded by controversies 
over whether the wealthy countries were making adequate concessions in agriculture 
and whether they were demanding too many concessions from poor countries in 
the area of non-agricultural market access.  In 2003, developing countries effectively 
ended negotiations at the Cancun ministerial meetings in by walking out of 
the meetings.  Subsequent efforts to advance the Doha round were based on 
negotiations among the G-4 (the United States, European Union, Brazil, and India) 
or the G-6 (the G-4 plus Japan and Australia)  However, in June 2007, negotiations 
among G-4 countries in Potsdam, Germany broke down over differences between 
the US and EU on the one side and Brazil and India on the other.  
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The impact of power disparities on the development of international markets 
is clear in the bias of tariffs in developed countries against imports from developing 
countries. Overall, though developing countries account for less than one-third of 
developed country imports, they pay two-thirds of the tariffs collected by developed 
countries (see Figure 9).37 On average, the United States has imposed tariffs on 
imports from developing countries that are more than three times higher than 
its tariffs on imports from developed 
countries. American tariffs for the poorest 
of the developing countries were more 
than 10 times higher than tariffs for 
wealthy OECD countries. In addition, 
tariff escalation impedes poor countries 
from diversifying into more value-added 
exports. For instance, effective levels 
of protection from leather to footwear 
doubles in the United States and Canada. 
The European Union’s tariff on cocoa beans is 1% but its tariff on chocolate is 
30%.38  In 2005, wealthy countries agreed to implement measures to reduce tariff 
discrimination against the poorest countries by agreeing to eliminate duties and 
quotas on most imports from LDCs.
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On average, the United States has imposed 
tariffs on imports from developing 
countries that are more than three times 
higher than its tariffs on imports from 
developed countries. American tariffs for 
the poorest of the developing countries 
were more than 10 times higher than tariffs 
for wealthy OECD countries.
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While rich countries campaign for the reduction of tariffs on industrial 
production, they continue to protect their agricultural sector. The European Union’s 
Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI)—a measure of the impact of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers—for agriculture is more than 25%. This stands in contrast to its OTRI for 
manufacturing that is less than 4%. Similarly, the U.S.’s OTRI for agriculture is 12%, 
while for industry it is only 4%.39 
At the same time that developed countries exclude poor countries from their 
agricultural markets, they provide their farmers with immense subsidies and dump 
subsidized agricultural commodities on global markets. Total OECD agricultural 
subsidies were $280 billion in 2004.40 These subsidies accounted for 30% of producer 
incomes, the same figure as in 1995—the date when the industrial countries had pledged 
in the Uruguay Round to begin phasing 
them out.41 Agricultural subsidies of rich 
countries exceed the entire GDP of sub-
Saharan Africa. They are approximately 
six times more than all foreign aid from 
rich countries.42 One consequence of this largesse is that European cows—each with an 
implicit income of $2.50 a day from government subsidies—have higher incomes than 
one-third of the world’s people.43 The costs of these policies, however, are also borne 
by people in wealthy countries. Agricultural protection costs the average consumer 
in developed countries about $1,000 per year through increased prices and taxes.44 
All but a small fraction of the benefits 
go to large farmers. In the United 
States, 87% of agricultural subsidies 
go to the largest 20% of farmers.45
Non-tariff barriers increase the 
protection of agriculture by wealthy countries. The problem is not just that developing 
countries are excluded from the markets of developed countries. Developed countries 
also dump subsidized agricultural commodities on global markets. For instance, the 
U.S. and E.U. sell half of the world’s wheat exports at prices 46% and 34% below the 
costs of production, respectively. Subsidies make it possible for the E.U. to be the largest 
exporter of skimmed milk in the world because its producers sell abroad at prices that 
are half the cost of production.46
The Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations promised to depart from previous 
negotiations by giving priority to the development concerns of poor countries. However, 
the Round has made only halting progress and the outcome will at most generate 
total benefits of no more than $60 billion, less than 0.2% of current global domestic 
product.47 “The limited nature of the gains from the Doha Round,” remarked Sandra 
Polaski, “goes far in explaining the lack of urgency demonstrated by WTO negotiators.”48 
According to a recent study sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation, the gains received 
by developing countries will be unequally distributed with China receiving the most 
Agricultural subsidies of rich countries 
exceed the entire GDP of sub-Saharan Africa. 
They are approximately six times more than 
all foreign aid from rich countries.
European cows—each with an implicit 
income of $2.50 a day from government 
subsidies—have higher incomes than one-
third of the world’s people.
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benefits at from 0.8-1.2% of its GDP. The poorest countries — including Bangladesh 
and many sub-Saharan African countries — are projected to be hurt by the most likely 
negotiating outcomes.49 These countries lack internationally-competitive agricultural 
sectors. Production from their industries will be displaced by imports from China and 
other developing countries with greater labor productivity. And the tariff reductions will 
diminish the least developed countries’ advantages under special preference programs 
such as the United States’ African Growth and Opportunities Act and the European 
Union’s Everything But Arms Initiative. Wealthy countries took a first step toward 
recognizing this problem at the Hong Kong ministerial meeting in December 2005 
when they agreed to allow duty-free and quota-free imports for 97% of their trade lines. 
The trouble with this concession is that a very large share of LDC exports fall in the 3% 
of tariff lines likely to be excluded from the measure.50 More generous concessions are 
necessary if the poorest countries are to benefit from the Doha Round.
The creation of the international regime for intellectual property rights (TRIPs) 
also reflects the persistent domination of rich countries. In recent years, there has 
been considerable controversy among economists whether the monopolies created by 
intellectual property rights promote or diminish innovation.51 Even as the United States 
Trade Representative worked with American multinationals to negotiate TRIPS during 
the Uruguay Round, the President’s Council of Economic Advisers and the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy in the White House expressed deep reservations about 
the deal.52 There are even more serious concerns about whether a single intellectual 
property rights regime is appropriate for both post-industrial economies with incomes 
of more than $20,000 per person and for industrializing economies with incomes of 
less than $1,000 per person.53 The issue is especially pertinent since today’s developed 
economies did not enforce private intellectual property rights—especially those of 
foreigners—when they were in the process of industrializing themselves.54
In theory, intellectual property rights should balance incentives to innovate with 
the social benefits gained from disseminating the innovation. However, under TRIPs, 
96% of all patent revenues go to firms from developed countries,55 while restrictions 
curtail the social benefits to developing countries 
available from innovations.56 In the public health sector, 
TRIPs essentially redistributes the benefits of medical 
innovation away from poor countries by raising the costs 
of new medicines while offering little incentive for giant pharmaceutical multinationals 
to develop medicines most needed in poor countries.57 The increased revenues granted 
to multinational pharmaceuticals are more likely to fund research focused on meeting 
the health needs of rich countries like the United States where the average annual 
health care budget is $4,000 per person rather than the problems in sub-Saharan Africa 
where average annual per capita health expenditures are just $20.58 Only where there 
has been an international outcry against the suffering imposed by TRIPs—e.g., the HIV/
AIDs pandemic—has the regime been relaxed. At the same time, developed countries 
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continue to demand “TRIPs plus” provisions in bilateral and regional treaties with 
more stringent patent protection than in the WTO agreement.59
Another reflection of the politics of globalization is that as restrictions on 
international trade and capital flows have been liberalized, restrictions on global labor 
markets have increased. Wealthy countries often welcome the “best and brightest” from 
poor countries while they tighten restrictions on migration of semi-skilled and unskilled 
labor. This is in striking contrast with the more liberal approaches of the 19th and early 
20th centuries when migration from Europe to the Americas enabled 60 million people 
to escape poverty and persecution while making major contributions to development in 
the western hemisphere.60 In the 1890s, immigrants to the United States accounted for 
about 9% of the population. The immigration rate for the United States in the 1990s was 
only 4%—but that was still the highest immigration rate of all wealthy countries.61 Overall 
immigration was an important factor in limiting global inequality during the era prior 
to WWI by creating a global labor market that diminished wage inequality around the 
world.62 In the past 25 years, labor mobility has played a more limited role in promoting 
convergence. The limits on labor mobility are apparent by the fact that while global 
differences in the prices of comparable goods 
are no more than 100%, differences in the 
price of comparable labor run from 500% 
to 1,000%.63 It is true that remittances have 
become substantial—growing to $199 billion 
in 2006.64 Their distribution helps to mitigate growing inequalities between wealthy and 
poor countries as well as between developing countries. Easing restrictions on migration 
could help even more. According to a study cited by the World Bank, increasing temporary 
migration by approximately 3% of the workforce in high-income countries would increase 
global welfare by more than $150 billion annually. This increase would be equally shared 
between people in developed and developing countries.65
Global Finance in an Unequal World. Governance of global finance is distinct from trade 
in that there is no central international organization like the WTO that promotes the 
development of financial markets. Instead, the global governance of finance takes place 
through a range of different bodies including: meetings of the finance ministers and 
central bank presidents of the major advanced industrial countries known as the Group 
of Seven (G7), the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organizations are 
more exclusive than the WTO. The membership of the first three excludes developing 
countries altogether—with the exception of Hong Kong and Singapore, which are 
part of the FSF’s membership.66 They only allow developing country participation 
on an ad hoc basis. The IMF has a more inclusive membership but its system of 
representation is weighted in favor of wealthy countries. It is frequently viewed as being 
unduly influenced by powerful countries.67  Bilateral and regional treaties also play an 
important role in the development of international financial markets. Finally, some of 
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the most important decisions affecting financial markets—for instance the ending of the 
pegged system of exchange rates established under the Bretton Woods system—resulted 
from unilateral actions by the United States. Under these circumstances, international 
financial markets show a bias that counters the benefits of global financial integration by 
shifting disadvantages to developing countries.
More Frequent Financial Crises. A recent study by the International Monetary Fund 
observed, “The proliferation of financial crises is often viewed as one of the defining 
aspects of the intensification of financial globalization over the last two decades.”68 
According to the World Bank, “Recent decades have seen a record wave of crises: by [2000] 
. . ., there had been 112 episodes of systemic banking crises in 93 states since the late 
1970s—and 51 borderline crises were recorded in 46 countries. These crises were both 
more numerous and expensive, compared with those 
earlier in history, and their costs often devastating in 
developing countries.”69 The probability that a country 
would experience a crisis in any given year increased 
from 5% during the first era of globalization 1880–1913 to 7% from 1945–1971 to more 
than 12% from 1973–1997 (see Figure 10). During this most recent period, developing 
countries were twice as likely as developed countries to suffer from a financial crisis. 
According to a study of 23 developed countries and 30 developing countries, developed 
countries experienced financial crises every 10.9 years on average, while the average 
for developing countries was every 5.4 years—or twice as frequently.70 These crises hit 
developing countries especially hard. Output losses from financial crises were 47% greater 
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in developing countries, with an average 
output loss of 9.21% of GDP for developing 
countries and 6.25% for developed ones.71 
Financial globalization has caused 
greater volatility in developing countries 
than in developed ones. During the 
1990s consumption in developing countries was three times as volatile than in industrial 
countries, with volatility increasing the most in internationally-integrated developing 
economies.72 International investors helped finance consumption booms in the late 1980s. 
In many developing countries, the booms were magnified by reforms—often encouraged 
by the IMF, World Bank, and United States government—that liberalized financial sectors 
and lifted constraints on the use of financial assets. Incoming investment contributed 
to the appreciation of the values of local currencies, which in turn created problems for 
local exporters and import-competing sectors who found the prices of their goods rising 
relative to competitors. Foreign exchange traders then speculated on the currencies, and 
international investors eventually pulled the plug and precipitously cut capital inflows.73 
For example, international capital flows to the five countries hardest hit by the Asian 
financial crisis (Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and South Korea) dropped 
from an inflow of $93 billion in 1996 to an outflow of $12 billion in 1997. This $105 
billion reversal was 11% of the combined pre-crisis GDP of these countries.74 In the wake 
of the crisis, exchange rates depreciated, greatly increasing the difficulty of paying foreign 
currency denominated debt. Finally, austere macroeconomic policies urged on them by 
the IMF magnified their economic downturn. The number of bankruptcies increased, and 
unemployment grew.
A number of features of the global economy enhance the degree to which global 
capital flows sow economic disruption in developing countries. The growing availability 
of short-term debt in international markets contributes to volatility, and developing 
countries with high levels of short-term debt are more likely to experience debt crises.75  
Credit ratings for developing countries follow market developments. During booms, 
positive ratings lower the costs of borrowing and increase capital inflows. During 
economic crises, downgraded ratings accelerate capital flight and increase the costs of 
borrowing. Credit ratings for developing countries are lowered more rapidly in times of 
adverse shocks than they are upgraded in favorable periods, and the capital outflows in 
economic crises are twice as large as inflows.76 The behavior of international investors 
adds to the problem. “Herding,” where investors mimic the actions of their peers 
and “momentum trading,” when investors pursue strategies based on recent market 
movements, increase the pro-cyclical movement of international capital flows. Incentives 
to maximize short-term returns and the linking of the compensation of investment 
managers to their performance relative to other managers increase the tendency toward 
herding.77 The use of financial instruments known as derivatives strengthens the 
downward pressures on the currencies of developing countries when investors rush to 
During the 1990s consumption in developing 
countries was three times as volatile than in 
industrial countries, with volatility increasing 
the most in internationally-integrated 
developing economies.
28 APSA   •   The Persistent Problem: Inequality, Difference, and the Challenge of Development
hedge their currency exposure in anticipation of a crisis.78 These factors can lead to the 
phenomenon known as “contagion,” where destabilizing investors expose developing 
countries to risks that are unrelated to their economic fundamentals.79 
These are some of the ways that the economies of developing countries have 
become profoundly affected by factors beyond their control. Another example is the 
manner that U.S. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker’s decision to raise 
American interest rates to historically unprecedented levels in 1980—widely known as 
“the Volcker shock”—greatly increased the debt burden of developing countries. The 
cost of the developing countries’ foreign debt is not only influenced by the decisions 
about interest rates made by policy-makers in wealthy nations. The availability of 
foreign direct investment is strongly related to business cycles in the United States80 
and portfolio equity flows from the United States to major emerging markets drop with 
increases to American interest rates and output growth.81 
Global financial markets impose sacrifices on developing countries by requiring 
them to borrow in “hard” foreign currencies regardless of their economic fundamentals.82  
This requirement effectively transfers exchange rate risk from rich to poor countries. 
During the period from 1999–2001, while less than 1% of the international debt for the 
U.S., UK, Japan, and Euro-currency countries was denominated in foreign currencies, 
93% of all developing country debt—including all of Latin American debt—was in foreign 
currencies.83 Using soft currencies to pay for loans denominated in hard currencies—what 
economists call “original sin”—has a positive and statistically significant relationship to 
exchange rate and macroeconomic volatility even after holding constant the level of 
development, openness, and foreign debt.
Cost of Restoring Stability. The incidence of economic crises has declined since 
2002. In recent years, many developing countries have tried to protect themselves 
from economic crises by accumulating large amounts of hard currency reserves and 
increasing the flexibility of exchange rates. Developing countries’ foreign reserves 
rose by $633 billion in 2006 after increases of around $400 billion in the previous 
two years. Since 1997, the ratio of foreign exchange reserve to GDP for all developing 
countries has risen from less than 10% to almost 25%.84 In essence, developing 
countries buy stability by transferring capital to the United States. In 2006 alone, 
the U.S. imported $870 billion in capital. The transfer helps to keep the American 
market open to imports.  It potentially gives the countries who have accumulated large 
foreign exchange surpluses—such as China and oil exporters—clout in global financial 
markets.85  Nonetheless, maintaining large reserve holdings imposes substantial costs 
on poor countries since foreign reserves provide a lower return than investments 
promoting domestic development. According to one estimate, the cost of the reserves 
added since the 1980s is close to 1% of developing countries’ GDP—an amount equal to 
the projected gains for developing countries from a successful conclusion of the Doha 
Round of trade negotiations.86
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IV. Domestic Inequality and the Politics of Economic Development
Economic and political inequality plays an important role in determining whether 
domestic politics will promote development or stagnation. To explain how this occurs, 
we investigate the mechanisms through which inequality affects economic change in 
developing countries. These mechanisms come into sharp contrast during colonial 
rule, and the manner in which they create disparate colonial legacies. In the last 25 
years, electoral democracy has spread across the developing world. We explore the 
puzzle of increased democracy but growing inequality. Finally, we examine some of the 
outcomes of recent economic development in an era of growing economic integration, 
rapid technological change, and persistent international and domestic inequality. We 
highlight the development of spatial inequality traps, cumulative inequalities, and 
declining economic security.
Inequality and Growth. Some economists have argued that inequality increases 
growth because the wealthy have higher savings rates,87 but this position has little 
empirical support.88 Other economists find that economic inequality reduces growth, 
but they have not reached a consensus on the ways in which this happens.89 Some point 
out that increased inequality diminishes growth because capital market imperfections—
due to informational asymmetries or institutional constraints—limit the borrowing 
capacity of people with few tangible assets even when they have viable economic 
projects.90 Other analysts contend 
that inequality incites demands for 
redistribution that interfere with the 
efficient allocation of resources.91 
These arguments posit that inequality 
has the same negative impact on 
growth regardless of its level. Recent 
research finds evidence that the impact 
of inequality on economic growth may be curvilinear. Increasing inequality at very low 
levels accelerates growth because too much equality reduces productive incentives, 
promotes freeriding, shirking, and increases supervision costs. In contrast, increases of 
inequality at very high levels are found to diminish growth by reducing incentives for 
those at the bottom of the social hierarchy, eroding social solidarity, magnifying social 
tensions, making property rights more insecure, and impeding the efficient operation of 
labor, capital, and product markets.92
We can have a closer look at how inequality affects economic development 
through micro-level studies that examine how collective action creates public goods 
such as infrastructure, sustainable environmental practices, and the protection of 
common resources. These studies find that the relationship between inequality and 
development is dependent on the institutional context in which it occurs. They 
offer an important argument in favor of economic inequality by showing that when 
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economic elites receive a sufficiently large share of the benefits, they will bear the 
costs of initiating collective action to produce public goods.93 However, there are 
three qualifications to this claim. First, the capacity of elites to initiate successful 
cooperation varies with the type of collective action problem. In some cases—for 
instance, regulation to prevent resource degradation—realization of the public good 
can be undermined if the incentives for cooperation by non-elites are insufficient.94 
Second, the more elites have attractive alternatives—for instance, through income 
diversification—the less willing they will be to pay the costs to produce public goods.95 
Finally, where elites create institutions to achieve public goods, they often devise the 
rules for their own benefit at the expense of others.96 Elites’ tendency to fashion flawed 
institutions leads to the most serious problem for economic development. High 
degrees of economic and political inequality enable elites to resist efforts to reform 
inefficient institutions. Moreover, it is now widely accepted that developing countries 
are poor in large measure because their institutions do not encourage productive 
activity.97
Reforming Economic Institutions. Why do inefficient institutions persist in a world 
where international competition creates incentives for greater efficiency; improvements 
in transportation and communications technology make people around the world more 
aware of developments abroad; and international financial institutions take on the 
mission of promoting global best practices? To answer this question, we must look at 
the politics of reforming economic institutions.
Higher levels of inequality make it more difficult to change inefficient economic 
institutions that benefit elites.98 Scholars have 
suggested two reasons why this is so. First, increasing 
inequality usually reduces the number of elites while 
increasing the numbers of subordinate groups. As 
their numbers decline, it becomes easier for elites to 
organize resistance to change, while collective action by subordinate groups becomes 
more difficult to organize as their numbers increase.99 Second, by placing more 
resources under elite control, increasing inequality increases elite capacity to establish 
forms of social organization—such as religious communities, ethnic networks, patron-
client relations, etc.—that link subordinate groups to them while dividing them among 
themselves. “Many of the inequities of the world” according to Amartya Sen, “survive 
by making allies out of the deprived and the abused.”100
The world complicates these stylized tendencies.101 Elite fragmentation and 
competition reduces their resistance to institutional change. Changes are more likely 
to be accepted in times of external threats and economic disaster. There are different 
types of institutional change, and elites are more likely to accept changes when they 
do not threaten their privileges. Elites are more likely to accept the introduction 
of industrial institutions when their societies have higher levels of human capital 
since it increases their future returns. As strategic actors, elites are also influenced by 
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the nature of their political coalitions and the availability of acceptable alternative 
coalitions. Finally, the impact of ideas and culture may be crucial. Examining the 
impact of colonialism on developing countries helps us to understand how inequality 
affects development today.
Colonial Legacies, Inequality, and Economic Development. In 1700, the per capita 
income of the United States was less than that of Mexico and 30 Caribbean countries. 
Today, it is more than eight times greater than the average for all developing countries. 
How did this huge gap develop? Analysts of economic development call attention to 
institutions as an important variable affecting economic performance.102 Why do some 
countries develop better institutions than others? Answers to this question point to 
the importance of colonial legacies in shaping institutions that are central to economic 
development. The more we learn about colonialism, the more impressive is the diversity 
of colonial regimes. Colonial rulers initiated different pathways to development in 
response to the colonies’ diverse factor endowments. These developmental trajectories 
were initiated with the establishment of different economic and political institutions 
that perpetuated disparate levels of social inequality. Political elites in countries 
with higher levels of inequality were better able to resist changes in institutions and 
policies that promoted development but threatened their privileges. In many cases, the 
perpetuation of inequality and inequitable institutions led to conflicts that disrupted 
the developmental process.
Colonial regimes were not imposed on blank canvas. Pre-colonial history has 
significant consequences for developing societies in the post-colonial era.103 Societies 
with well-established pre-colonial state structures and bureaucratic cultures tend to 
achieve better enforcement of property rights and higher levels of development than 
societies without these pre-colonial institutions.104
Analysts investigating the diverse colonial experience in the Americas have 
found that different endowments of colonies, including climates, soils, and density 
of indigenous population, led to different developmental strategies, institutions, 
and levels of inequality even in colonies ruled by the same colonial power.105 Extreme 
economic inequality developed where climate and soils supported the cultivation 
of lucrative crops for export to the world market such as sugar and coffee. Slaves 
were imported in the sugar-producing areas of the Caribbean and Brazil where the 
indigenous population was too small to support plantation agriculture. In areas 
with abundant labor, the Spanish imposed practices (e.g. encomienda) that provided 
Europeans with exclusive claims on land, minerals, and the right to the labor of local 
subjects. Extreme inequality often developed between the oligarchies of European 
descent and large populations descending from slaves, indigenous peoples, or mixed 
backgrounds. In countries like Guatemala, Peru, and El Salvador, elites used their 
power to delay the extension of the vote, and the political consequences of economic 
inequality limited investment in public goods such as education and infrastructure 
that are vital to economic development. The contrast with the developmental 
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trajectories of the northeastern United States and Canada is striking. In these 
areas, cheap but cultivable land and costly labor led to more equitable development 
characterized by inclusive citizen rights, widespread public education, and greater 
access to economic opportunities. These factors, coupled with greater public 
investment in infrastructure and policies that made land and capital more readily 
available, promoted more extensive market networks, a greater pace of innovation, 
more efficient resource use, and higher rates of growth. Moreover, the developmental 
trajectories of societies like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru differ from those of 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica where factor endowments did not allow for labor-
intensive mining or large-scale plantation farming.
It was not the plunder of resources—though of that there was plenty—that 
created the gap between developing and advanced industrial societies, it was the 
institutional differences. Inclusive property rights’ regimes enabled some colonies 
and former colonies to respond more effectively to the opportunities presented by 
the industrial revolution. Extractive institutions that excluded vast sections of the 
population from secure property rights were adequate for plantation agriculture or 
mineral extraction, but they were ill-suited for a dynamic industrial society.
The capabilities of the political system are also important. The type of political and 
economic institutions developed by colonial rulers cannot be easily reduced to factor 
endowments. The nature of political encounters with colonial subjects created a dynamic 
of its own. The French colonial legacy in Senegal contrasts sharply with that in Togo. 
The British colonial legacy in India contrasts with that in Sierra Leone. A useful way of 
conceptualizing these differences is in terms of: (1) the extent to which the colonial regime 
extended democratic political practices; (2) variation in administrative capacity; and (3) 
ethnic imbalances in the colonial state’s administration, military, and economic policy.106
Inequality and variation in economic and political institutions are important 
explanations of another factor causing disparate levels of development between wealthy 
and poor countries: destabilizing social conflict. In much of the developing world, 
colonialism contributed to instability by creating political boundaries that gathered 
disparate social groups into the 
same political unit for the sake of 
administrative convenience. In some 
cases, colonial rulers attempted to 
facilitate their rule by encouraging 
the construction of rival identities among different groups.107 Przeworski and Curvale 
demonstrate that political instability helps to explain the gap in economic development 
between the United States and Latin America today. Political instability and conflict 
caused in part by economic and political inequality are an important part of the 
explanation of why Latin American countries fell behind. In Latin America, the wars 
of independence and their aftermath impeded growth prior to 1870. When political 
institutions capable of resolving conflict were finally established, economies grew even 
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when the institutions were inequitable. However, throughout the entire period, political 
inequality—in the form of lower levels of suffrage—frequently contributed to politically 
destabilizing distributional conflicts—e.g. over land, wages, and working conditions—
which in turn were associated with lower levels of growth.108
More Democracy but Increasing Inequality. In the last 30 years, the world has 
seen a dramatic spread of democracy. The number of countries with democratically-
elected governments has exploded from 39 in 1974 to 122 in 2005.109 At the same 
time, domestic inequality has increased in most developing countries. From 1990 
to 2004, the share of consumption of the poorest fifth of the people in developing 
countries declined from 4.6% to 3.9%.110 According to an authoritative study 
covering countries with 80% of the world’s population, between the1950s and 
the 1990s inequality increased in 48 of 73 countries (66%) with a 59% share of 
the population of all countries in the study. Inequality decreased in only 9 of 73 
countries (12%) with only 5% of the population of countries in the study (see Figure 
11).111 While democracy does not inevitably lower inequality, it offers the excluded 
and underprivileged the opportunity to make public policy more responsive to 
their needs. Why hasn’t the spread of political equality under democracy reduced 
economic inequality?
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Impact of International Markets and Technological Development. Part of the 
explanation for increasing inequality in emerging democracies lies in the economic 
sphere. Wealthy countries have shaped global markets in ways that contribute to more 
frequent economic crises and distort economic development in poor countries by 
discriminating against their agriculture, industry, and labor.112 As developing countries 
become more exposed to international markets, many have reduced social welfare 
spending.113 Greater dependence on international finance has often compelled developing 
countries to adopt fiscal conservatism and curtail redistributive policies.114
Economic crises, often resulting from greater exposure to international markets, 
cause greater inequality. Unlike most wealthy countries, poor countries are unable 
to gain access to international finance at times of economic crisis. Instead, they 
are obliged to impose austerity measures that reduce social welfare benefits for the 
poorest members of society.115 Spending on public education 
and public health, which both promote economic development 
while improving the plight of the poor, are frequently hard 
hit. Moreover, in the wake of economic crises, the wealthy 
disproportionately benefit from bailouts—as depositors, creditors, equity owners, etc.—
while the less affluent suffer disproportionately from the increasing unemployment, 
declining real wages, and reductions in social welfare programs associated with 
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Figure 12: Financial Crises and Income Distribution: Pre- and Post-Crisis Gini Coecients for Select Countries 
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austerity measures. Figure 12 demonstrates that financial crises consistently increase 
inequality.116
Finally, though the mechanisms vary from country to country and even within 
the same country at different times, technological change favoring skilled workers has 
interacted with economic liberalization to increase inequality.117 Inflows of foreign 
direct investment have increased demand for skilled labor which has enlarged the 
skill  premium and contributed to greater wage inequality.  Outsourcing  production 
of intermediate goods from developed to developing countries increases inequality 
by enhancing the demand for skilled workers in developing countries.   In an effort 
to become internationally competitive and upgrade their export product mix, firms 
in developing countries often adopt skill-intensive technologies that increase the 
earnings gap between skilled and unskilled workers.
Limited Advance of Democracy in Developing Countries. Pressure for greater 
equity has also been constrained by the limited advance of democracy. Many 
developing countries have some of the trappings of democracy, but their political 
systems are still not responsive to the needs of their underprivileged citizens. Thomas 
Carothers estimates that of the nearly 100 developing countries considered as being 
in transition to democracy, less than 20 are clearly en route to becoming successful, 
well-functioning democracies.118 The rest are in a 
“grey zone . . . between full-fledged democracy and 
outright dictatorship.”119 In some countries, there 
is electoral competition, but political elites are 
“profoundly cut off from the citizenry.” Citizens 
do not participate outside of elections, and 
they view politics as a “corrupt, elite-dominated 
domain.” In other developing countries, there is little political competition because 
the political system is dominated by a single party that exploits the state’s resources 
to advance the political and economic interests of its members.120 Observing that 
“the trend toward democracy has been accompanied by an even more dramatic trend 
toward pseudodemocracy,”121 Larry Diamond finds that in 2001 only 26% of 162 
developing countries were liberal democracies while 19% were “electoral democracies” 
with substantial limits on civil liberties. Another 39% belonged to various categories of 
“hybrid regimes” that combine democratic and authoritarian elements and 15% were 
“politically closed authoritarian regimes” (see Figure 13).122 Most analysts agree that 
despite important advances, the practice of democracy in a large number of developing 
countries is limited by weak enforcement of civil liberties,123 excessive centralization 
of power in the executive branch, weak checks and balances between different 
governmental agencies,124 and limited participation by the poorer segments of society 
due to low levels of basic education and political literacy.125 These limits make it more 
difficult for citizens to hold their governments accountable. They make it easier for 
public policy to favor elites and increase inequality.
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New Patterns of Popular Mobilization. A third explanation for the increase of 
inequality under democracy lies in the strategies of political elites to maintain popular 
support. By the end of the 1970s, the public became dissatisfied with the economic 
problems—e.g. high inflation, the inefficient provision of goods and services, limited 
opportunities, etc.—that resulted from the import substitution industrialization 
policies in many developing countries. At the same time, the internationalization of 
markets for trade and finance created opportunities to promote economic growth 
through expanded trade and accessing foreign capital and technology. Policy-makers 
were influenced by the international diffusion of ideas promoting market-based 
solutions to public problems. They also encountered strong pressure from international 
financial institutions and powerful developed countries to liberalize their policies 
and open their markets. These developments created incentives for political leaders to 
develop new strategies to mobilize political support in order to make the new policies 
politically acceptable even when they were contributing to increasing inequality.
Figure 13: Share of Regime Types in Developing Societies, 2001*
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The strategies have varied with the political context, but in virtually all cases 
political leaders were careful not to implement reforms that undermined their own 
power. If possible, they designed reforms to boost their political support. In generating 
unprecedented growth, China’s economic reforms created a new capitalist class that 
remains a bulwark of political support for the Communist Party even as its policies 
relegate state socialism to the dustbin of history.  Reforms in India have elevated the 
role of business in policy-making.126 Economic policy change in sub-Saharan Africa 
often reinforced the positions of powerful political elites because it strengthened their 
neo-patrimonial rule.127 In Latin America, politicians have used new policies to build 
alliances with powerful segments of the business community who in turn provide 
financial contributions used to mobilize popular political support.128 Technocrats 
ascended to powerful policy-making positions to signal commitment to economic 
reforms, and they contributed to a process of policy formation that was more insulated 
from popular pressure.129 
In many countries, “partial reforms” have 
benefited some actors who in turn stymie further 
reforms when they threaten their power.130  
Privatization has been a particularly important 
means of consolidating core constituencies and 
attracting support from particular segments of 
the business community including international 
business.131 In their review of the distributional impact of a wide range of privatization 
programs, Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis conclude, “At least initially, and on 
average, privatization has worsened wealth distribution and to a lesser extent, income 
distribution.”132
At the same time that political leaders cultivated the support of business and 
other powerful groups for economic reforms, they also attempted to strengthen popular 
backing for their regime. In Africa, there were few institutionalized means to represent 
popular interests.133 Political elites used foreign assistance and economic reform 
to enhance their power and bolster their allies in the elite strata of society.134 If any 
resources were transferred to the lower echelons of society, it was done largely through 
patronage-based programs that were designed to exchange those resources for popular 
support for the ruling coalition.135
In Latin America, urban migration since the 1950s and the growth of the informal 
and service sectors diminished the importance of organized labor and eroded the bases 
of support for populist parties. Political leaders adopted new strategies for mobilizing 
support in response to these changes. “Neopopulism” replaced the organizational 
resources of labor unions with the financial power of business as the currency of 
political mobilization. In Argentina and Mexico, legal restrictions were placed on the 
activities of trade unions.136 Mobilizing the unorganized urban poor and middle class 
became increasingly central to neopopulist electoral strategies. Some neopopulist 
Privatization has been a particularly 
important means of consolidating 
core constituencies and attracting 
support from particular segments of 
the business community including 
international business.
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leaders created anti-poverty programs directly under their control as a source of 
patronage that they used to recruit leadership and build popular support.137 Almost all 
leaders courted support by using the mass media, especially television, to appeal to the 
popular classes. Many broadcasted spectacles that highlighted their charismatic appeal 
and demonstrated their affinity for popular culture.138 A startling number of political 
leaders implementing neoliberal reforms after electoral campaigns made no mention 
of this new policy direction. From 1980 to 1995, of the 33 elected governments that 
implemented neoliberal reforms in Latin America, 12 adopted neoliberal reforms only 
after abruptly abandoning their previous positions.139
Beginning in the late 1990s, Latin American voters became disillusioned with 
neo-liberal reforms that had failed to address their country’s persistent or worsening 
of inequality. Since 2000, many Latin American countries elected politicians who 
pledged to ameliorate the inequities associated with neoliberal economic reforms. 
Whether these political leaders will succeed in creating diversified economies that can 
take advantage of sustained high levels of growth and more equitable development 
remains to be seen.
Persistent Inequalities Often Increase Inefficiency and Economic Insecurity. Inequality 
shapes economic geography. Participation in markets requires physical and human 
infrastructure that integrates people with the market. People lacking political influence 
receive fewer and lower quality public services than more influential ones. These 
disparities become acute when budgets for 
public investment come under pressure. 
The uneven distribution of infrastructure 
and social services can generate “spatial 
inequality traps”140 that leave vast expanses 
of territory backward and economically stagnant. In nine East African countries, 
maintenance spending covered only 20% of current road networks, and for Africa as a 
whole maintenance on roads was less than half the necessary expenditure in the early 
1990s.141 In Latin America, investment in infrastructure dropped from 3% of GDP in 
1980 to less than 1% in 2001.142 In India, the share of state government expenditures on 
social services declined from 53% in the 1980s to 35% in the 1990s while the share of 
expenditure on economic services declined from 44% to 30%.143
Multiple inequalities cumulate. They impose the worst suffering. Minorities, 
women, and indigenous peoples are acute victims of inequality traps. They face 
disproportionate impediments to accessing 
capital and education. Infrastructure 
in their areas is often substandard. 
Consequently, they are less able to participate in the benefits of economic development, 
and they suffer higher rates of poverty. In Mexico, indigenous Mexicans have an 81% 
poverty rate compared to 18% for the rest of the population.144 Women and female 
children in India’s poorest state of Bihar are not only the least educated (female literacy 
The uneven distribution of infrastructure and 
social services can generate spatial inequality 
traps that leave vast expanses of territory 
backward and economically stagnant.
Minorities, women, and indigenous peoples 
are acute victims of inequality traps. 
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China: Rapid Growth but Increasing Inequality and Insecurity
Inequality and insecurity are serious problems even in the world’s fastest growing 
economy. China enjoyed an annual rate of growth of 9.6% from 1979 to 2006.145  This 
growth has produced a huge drop in poverty. More than 400,000 people have been lifted 
above the absolute poverty line during this period. At the same time, China has been 
transformed from one of Asia’s most equal societies to one of its most unequal ones — 
China’s Gini coefficient for income distribution increased from 0.30 in 1982 to 0.45 in 2002. 
The distribution of wealth was even more unequal with a 0.55 Gini coefficient.146
Economic insecurity has also increased. Under the old state socialist system, life-time 
employment was guaranteed and the danwei system provided social welfare benefits 
through the work unit. These benefits have been rolled back. Employment is now 
increasingly through the “labor contract system” for public and large private firms, 
and through often highly informal labor markets for others. Managers of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and other public firms now lay off workers and end labor practices 
that they fear result in competitive disadvantage. Eager to attract more foreign and 
domestic investment and ensure that enterprises in their localities are successful, many 
local governments turn a blind eye to labor abuses.
Employment in SOEs dropped from a peak of 110 million in 1995 to 65 million in 2005. 
Employment in town and village enterprises (TVEs, many of which are now privatized) 
plunged from more than 36 million in 1991 to 14 million in 2005. Though employment 
outside the state and collective sectors has grown rapidly—increasing from 23 million 
in 1994 to 102 million in 2005, it has not grown fast enough to absorb laid-off workers. 
Unemployment has risen, and many workers have been forced into insecure jobs in the 
informal sector.147
These changes in employment might be less serious if they occurred in a society with 
an adequate social safety net. Unfortunately, social welfare programs have weakened 
considerably. Modest unemployment benefits favor workers from better-endowed 
SOEs.148 Workers laid off from collective, private, or foreign enterprises, receive little if 
any benefits. Reforms have decentralized responsibility for welfare programs to the local 
level, but the share of county and village governments in national fiscal revenues and 
expenditures has continuously declined over the last decade. Wealthier localities no 
longer transfer funds to poorer ones. At best, poverty-stricken localities receive ad hoc 
subsidies from the central government. The Chinese must now pay user fees for education 
and health. One study found that education costs ranged from 12-35% of household 
outlays. Health care ranged between 5-14% of income.149 The poor sacrifice the most. 
School attendance has dropped, especially among girls - from 1980 to 1990, the number 
of girls attending primary school plummeted from 65 million to 57 million. By 2000, the 
number remained 3 million below the 1980 level even though the female population had 
grown by 27%.150 The World Health Organization rated China’s health care system the 
third most inequitable system in the world, just after Burma and Brazil.151  
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India: Persistent Problems of Inequality and Insecurity Despite 
Accelerating Growth
Despite the acceleration of India’s economic growth in recent years, increasing inequality 
and declining security will remain persistent problems for the foreseeable future. 
India’s economy has grown at an annual rate of 8.5% in the four years since 2003.152 
Industrial growth has accelerated to almost 10% annually since 2004. Annual employment 
generation rose from 1% during 1994-2000 to 2% per year during 2000-2005.153 Poverty 
has declined steadily during the reform period. Only 22% lived below the poverty line in 
2004.154
India’s accelerated growth has generated considerable benefits, but these have not been 
evenly distributed. Economic inequalities have worsened since the early 1980s. The top 
1% of income-earners receive a growing share of the total income.155 The share of profits 
in the value-added portion of the organized manufacturing sector increased from 
11.6% in 1987 to 45.5% in 2003 while the share of wages dropped from 56.4% to 35.7%. 
From 1993-1994 to 1999-2000 (the latest year data are available), inequality of urban 
wages increased by 25% from a Gini coefficient of 0.4 to 0.5.156 Regional inequality is also 
growing. The variation of per capita income of Indian states rose from 25% in the 1980s 
to 43% in the 1990s.157
Rising inequality has been accompanied by growing economic insecurity. While job 
creation accelerated during 2000-2005, it was still less than the 2.9% annual growth of the 
labor force. All of the new jobs were created in the informal sector where workers do not 
receive pensions or compensation for sickness or work accidents. The share of informal 
sector employment to total employment rose from 92.7% to 94.15%.158
The challenge of transforming India’s huge agricultural sector—60% of India’s workforce 
continues to be employed in agriculture even though the share of agriculture in its 
economy has declined to 18.5%—means that the problems of inequality and insecurity 
will persist for the foreseeable future. Under the leadership of Manmohan Singh, the 
Government of India attempted to promote rural development by increasing investment 
in rural infrastructure, but it is difficult to see how agriculture can be modernized without 
seriously disrupting an agrarian structure with 80% of the agricultural holdings less than 
five acres. A key element of the new strategy is to promote a “second green revolution 
by shifting production from cereals to higher value crops such as fruits, vegetables, 
dairy, and meat.” The government is taking measures to encourage the involvement of 
private-sector corporations through contract farming to promote this transformation. 
However, this strategy is likely to promote geographical disparities as corporations 
concentrate their efforts in the most favorable areas. It may also increase rural inequality 
since corporations are likely to prefer contracts with large rather than small farmers. The 
success of this strategy will challenge Indian policy-makers to devise policies to alleviate 
the social disruption that accompanies the radical transformation of the livelihoods of 
millions of small farmers.159
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rates in some districts are below 3%) but also the most malnourished. Most developing 
societies are patrilineal with inheritance passed on to men. Property rights regimes 
often discriminate against women even in societies—like in sub-Saharan Africa—where 
agricultural production depends heavily on women’s labor. Families invest less human 
capital in their female children, and societies impose restrictions on women’s mobility. 
Labor markets discriminate against women, paying them less for comparable work.
The accumulation of these disparities curtail the life chances of women even 
though they work significantly longer hours than men when market and non-market 
activity is combined. The worst manifestation of this inequality is in the female 
infanticide that produces sex ratios of 1.17 males (under four years old) to females in 
China, 1.15 in Korea and 1.08 in India.160 
High levels of inequality can undermine 
the efficiency of markets. Property rights are 
unevenly enforced with claims by women and the 
poor being the least secure.161  Wealth and power 
affect the allocation of resources by markets with 
imperfect information. This is especially true for 
financial markets. Credit markets, in countries like 
Indonesia and Mexico, deem wealthy borrowers 
more creditworthy and charge them lower interest rates.162 Poorer individuals who 
are unable to provide collateral cannot get credit at any interest rate regardless of 
the merit of their projects. In many countries including Brazil, India, Thailand, and 
Pakistan, politically-connected firms get privileged access to finance from public sector 
agencies.163 In Mexico, politically-connected firms absorb so much finance that they 
reduce the access of competitors even though they were 33% more likely to default.164 
Insider trading on equity markets like India, Pakistan, and Brazil may artificially inflate 
or deflate prices causing small investors to lose their savings.165 Economic trends within 
developing countries have significantly increased economic insecurity. Since there are few 
good indicators of changes in the aggregate level of economic security, this is one aspect 
of economic development that is not fully appreciated. Unemployment is one measure 
of economic insecurity. However, unemployment rates are only crude indicators since 
most people in developing countries cannot afford 
to be unemployed. They find some job or another—
often in the informal economy—to eke out their 
survival. Thus, unemployment rates understate 
levels of economic insecurity because they do not 
account for underemployment, job insecurity, lack of employee rights at the workplace, 
and inadequacy of income to sustain people through difficult times, etc. Despite robust 
economic growth and a 2% annual productivity growth since 1995, unemployment is up 
over the last 10 years in every developing region but the Middle East and Northern Africa 
(see Figure 14).
High levels of inequality can 
undermine the efficiency of markets. 
Property rights are unevenly 
enforced with claims by women 
and the poor being the least secure.
Wealth and power affect the 
allocation of resources by markets 
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Economic trends within developing 
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The size of the informal economy is another rough indicator of economic 
insecurity in developing societies. One must be careful in generalizing about this sector 
since it can include everything from 
highly-paid consultants and information 
technology workers to the underemployed 
struggling to earn a meager survival as 
shoeshine boys, street vendors, sweatshop 
employees, sex workers, and petty criminals. Nevertheless, the vast majority of workers 
in the informal economy are poor and their jobs are insecure because their employment 
is not recognized or protected under any legal framework. Though the informal 
economy is a source of additional jobs, most of them are low paid and subject to 
arbitrary dismissal without any legal recourse. Many in the informal economy work in 
conditions that are not subject to safety and health protections, and in most cases, they 
are without unions or other forms of collective representation. Non-agricultural self-
employment is one of the best indicators of the size of the informal sector. As Figure 15 
documents, it has grown substantially in virtually all regions of the developing world. In 
Africa, 90% of new employment was in the informal economy.166 In Latin America in the 
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Figure 14: Unemployment in Developing Countries By Region
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economy are poor and their jobs are insecure 
because their employment is not recognized 
or protected under any legal framework.
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1980s and 1990s, 80% of new jobs created were 
in the informal sector.167 
The trend toward greater unemployment 
and expansion of the informal economy has 
particularly troublesome consequences for 
economic insecurity at a time when social 
welfare spending in developing countries is on the decline. From 1972–1974, central 
government welfare spending in 52 developing countries averaged 3.2% of their GDP. 
In 1994–1995, welfare spending in these countries dropped to 2.5%.168 The pressures 
that limit developing countries’ capacity to fund social welfare programs raise serious 
concerns about their capacity to relieve economic insecurity. Since the informal 
economy remains outside of the state’s tax base, its growth diminishes the share 
of the economy that provides government revenue. As its share of the revenue base 
diminishes, the state’s capacity to provide for social protection also declines relative 
to the needs of the workforce. At a time when increasing global economic integration 
makes the provision of social protection through programs like unemployment 
compensation, retraining, social security, etc. more vital than ever, states in many 
developing societies may be less able to meet the needs of the men and women in 
their workforce.
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Figure 15:  Non-Agricultural Self-Employment in Developing Countries: Average Percent of Total   
 Non-Agricultural Employment, 1980-1989 and 1990-2000
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V. Confronting Social Difference: Marginalization,  
Conflict, or Recognition?
The social diversity of developing countries creates a formidable challenge as they try 
to consolidate their democracies. In contrast to most advanced industrial countries 
that became nations before they democratized, many developing countries must 
democratize as they build their nations. This challenge is made more formidable by 
the fact that the boundaries of post-colonial countries were fashioned more to the 
convenience of colonial administrators than reflecting the demographic realities of 
developing societies. 
When social difference overlaps with hierarchies of power, it can lead to 
discrimination, marginalization, and conflict. In the colonies of Latin America for 
instance, countries gained their independence relatively early, but European settlers 
dominated the early post-colonial political regimes and they marginalized indigenous 
peoples. In some cases, they forced indigenous peoples to perform cheap labor. In other 
cases, they relegated them to remote areas and ignored them. In still other cases, they 
repressed them as a security threat.169 Independence occurred much later in Africa, the 
The Myth of the “Primordial” Ethnic Conflict 
Political scientists’ understanding of the causes of ethnic conflict has made considerable 
progress in the last 15 years. Despite its demonstrable flaws, one explanation that has 
been remarkably influential among policy-makers and the public is that the violent 
conflict between religious and ethnic groups is a consequence of ancient hatreds, 
anchored in a primordial past.170  “Primordial” is a term that evokes the “primitive,” the 
“tribal,” and the “fanatic.” This point of view understates the importance of immediate 
circumstances in provoking conflicts, especially the ruthless strategies of domestic 
political leaders and foreign intervention.171   It suggests that these conflicts are a fixed 
condition that is not amenable to resolution.
 While it is true that violence often arises in societies with ethnic differences, 
peaceful relations are in fact more characteristic of societies with ethnic diversity.172  
Social relations among ethnic groups can be organized in different ways. Some are 
conducive to the outbreak of violence while others are better able to accommodate 
differences.173  It makes a big difference whether the government is strong and intent 
on preventing conflict or weak and controlled by leaders who intend to stir up ethnic 
violence for their political advantage. In its assumption that people simply reflect 
the identities and values attributed to broader social groups, the primordial view of 
ethnic conflict underestimates the contingency of group identities and the scope of an 
individual agency to create alternative identities. In sum, explaining conflict in terms 
of primordial antagonisms portrays ethnic cleavages as objective, unchanging, and 
impervious to political interventions when in fact they are subjective, contingent, and 
greatly affected by contemporary politics.174  
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Middle East, South, and Southeast Asia. In these regions, the predominant lines of tension 
and conflict were between different ethnic groups as they competed for political power.
Democracy and Violence. The presence and quality of democracy is a key factor 
affecting conflict between ethnic and religious groups. As developments in Iraq after 
the American intervention in 2003 demonstrate, holding democratic elections is not 
sufficient to prevent the outbreak of conflict. Indeed, emerging democracies tend to 
see higher levels of conflict than authoritarian regimes.175  Authoritarian regimes are no 
more even-handed with respect to ethnic, class, and gender differences, but they use 
their monopoly of coercive and administrative power to repress dissent. The weakening 
of state authority and the consequent increase in political instability and uncertainty 
that are often associated with the initial phases of democratic transitions are positively 
related to the outbreak of violent conflict. According to one study, the odds of the onset 
of civil war in a given year are estimated to increase by 67% if there was instability in 
the governing arrangements in the previous three years.176 The rapid social and political 
change that accompanies democratization may lead to a gap between the capacity of 
fledgling political institutions and the demands of a highly mobilized public.177 In these 
circumstances, politicians often mobilize popular support by constructing divisive 
identities that exploit insecurities of different social groups.178 
Though it is widely felt that there has been an upsurge in civil strife in the world 
with the end of the Cold War, social scientists agree that the number of existing violent 
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conflicts peaked in 1992 and has since declined.179 There have been important changes in 
the nature of violent conflict around the world. Conflict today occurs more often within 
states than between them. In fact, 95% of all 
armed conflict is now within countries.180 At the 
same time, violent conflict has been increasingly 
concentrated in poor countries. A recent World 
Bank Study estimated that low-income countries are 15 times more likely to experience 
internal conflicts than richer countries.181 
While armed conflict between countries and ethnic groups is on the decline, 
violent crime is a growing problem in developing societies. A significant positive 
relationship has been shown to exist between income inequality and violent crime, even 
after controlling for other causes of crime.182  
While the lives of the wealthy in developing 
societies are increasingly protected by private 
security guards and gated communities, a 
1999–2000 World Bank survey of people in developing countries found that, in the 
minds of the poor, physical insecurity has become a more serious problem than 
poverty.183
Democratic political systems offer the promise of alleviating the problems 
of discrimination, marginalization, and violent conflict between social groups. 
Citizenship in democracy provides equal rights to all, but historically marginalized 
and discriminated peoples do not necessarily participate in politics on a level playing 
field. Dominant groups often exercise a preponderant influence in shaping the rules 
of the game. Governments may lack the capacity or the will to enforce equal rights for 
everyone.184 Nonetheless, democratic politics encourages leaders and participants to 
articulate distinctive identities and interests that challenge democratic political systems 
to live up to their promise of equitable inclusion. Liberal democracy also provides 
associational space for groups to organize in an attempt to realize these interests.
Marginalization and the Post-Liberal Challenge. The political demands of social 
groups that have historically suffered discrimination and marginalization present 
democratic political systems with what Deborah Yashar has called the “postliberal 
challenge.”185 From its beginning in the West at the end of the 18th century, the spread 
of modern, liberal democracy was based on the premise that political communities 
were culturally homogenous. States should be administratively centralized, and 
citizenship should be based on legal systems that extend uniform rights and 
obligations to all individual citizens. In the process, social and cultural differences 
were ignored, or worse, undermined in the name of assimilation. Equality meant 
sameness.186 Yet as, Alfred Stepan notes, “In multinational polities . . . some groups 
may be able to participate fully as individual citizens only if they acquire, as a group, 
the right to have schooling, mass media, and religious or even legal structures that 
correspond to their language and culture.”187
Low-income countries are 15 times 
more likely to experience internal 
conflicts than richer countries.
A significant positive relationship has 
been shown to exist between income 
inequality and violent crime...
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Across the developing world, the demands of marginalized citizens for group 
rights188  have challenged liberal premises. A number of developing countries have 
attempted to accommodate social diversity by recognizing social difference. India’s 
legal system supplements uniform citizens’ rights with a pluralistic approach that 
offers different systems of personal law to accommodate different religious groups. 
In Latin America, the constitutions of several countries—including Colombia (1991), 
Peru (1993), Bolivia (1994), and Ecuador (1998)—have recently included provisions to 
recognize indigenous laws and norms, and authority systems.189 Though promising 
departures, these measures sometimes are of limited substance. Countries attempting 
to accommodate social diversity by recognizing social difference must chart their own 
course by striking a distinctive balance between recognizing difference and support 
for universal individual rights. Only then can they ensure that the recognition of 
difference does not enable some members to dominate others in the group and 
that such recognition is not used as a ploy to obscure social and political inequities 
between groups.190
The efforts of the international community to promote universal human rights 
and combat the most outrageous forms of discrimination and civil violence have 
intensified since the end of the Cold War. The U.S., U.N., and numerous NGOs are 
promoting truth commissions and criminal tribunals as tools with which to further the 
goals of conflict resolution, human rights, and democratic change. To date, scholars 
have given these institutions mixed reviews. Recent studies have found that countries 
with truth commissions are more likely to achieve political stability, improve human 
rights, and enhance the quality of their democracy.191 However, several other studies 
have found that without widespread political support, transitional justice investigations 
may be destabilizing.192 Any reconciliation process must attempt to resolve the tension 
between the need for judgment and the need for political stability. Strategies to 
accommodate potential spoilers—
usually pragmatic compromises—
often involve concessions that grant 
power to those who have a strong 
interest in obstructing change toward 
greater democracy.193 Transitional 
justice institutions may also generate 
a nationalist backlash in countries 
where they are not perceived as legitimate.194
Persistent inequality at the domestic and international levels presents formidable 
challenges to the goals of these institutions. Truth commissions in several countries, 
including Guatemala, South Africa, Peru, and Ghana, identified economic inequality 
and political exclusion as major factors contributing to cycles of political violence 
and repression.195 Scholars have found that absolute poverty and inequality are 
correlated with high levels of repression.196 These findings suggest that persistent 
Truth commissions in several countries ... 
identified economic inequality and political 
exclusion as major factors contributing to cycles 
of political violence and repression. Scholars 
have found that absolute poverty and inequality 
are correlated with high levels of repression.
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structural inequalities are likely to undermine the contributions of human rights 
investigations to reconciliation in the long term. For example, the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission achieved notable success in promoting domestic 
reconciliation,197 and it is widely viewed as a model for newly democratizing countries. 
Despite these successes, a 2004 survey found that the number of black South Africans 
reporting historical land grievances rose between 2003 and 2004.198 If this trend 
continues, it is likely to pose problems for South Africa’s reconciliation process 
over the long term. International inequality also affects the agenda of human rights 
organizations and institutions. It is notable, for example, that transitional justice 
institutions hold local leaders in developing countries accountable for past human 
rights violations, but have generally not investigated the role of foreign interventions 
by powerful states.199
VI. Conflict and Economic Development
The incidence of war and civil strife is much greater in the world’s 58 poorest countries 
than in other countries. According to one study 73% of the population in these 
countries have recently experienced a civil 
war. This violence reduced their average per 
capita growth rate by 2.3% per year.200  Violent 
conflict decimates the economic infrastructure, 
disrupts production, and destroys productive facilities. The lack of security discourages 
investment, both foreign and domestic. Indeed, as a result of conflict, investment is 
redistributed from the production of goods and services to the production of violence. 
Entrepreneurial skills are diverted to increasing destruction rather than production. 
Political instability prevents long-term planning in both the public and private sector. 
Youth are killed in wars rather than educated in schools. Violence makes the collective 
action necessary to provide public goods difficult if not impossible to accomplish. 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti are but a few examples of societies whose economies have 
been devastated by violent conflicts.
A more subtle issue is whether “latent conflict”—often in the form of ethnic 
rivalries—is detrimental to economic development. There are many reasons to think 
that this might be the case. Theoretical models suggest that ethnically heterogeneous 
societies may: engage in more rent-seeking,201 implement inefficient forms of 
redistribution,202 fight “wars of attrition” that delay needed economic reforms,203 and 
have more difficulties reaching cooperative agreements to provide public goods.204 
Initial analysis of empirical evidence indicated that ethnically and religiously diverse 
societies had more corruption205 and were associated with underdeveloped financial 
systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, low rates of education, and insufficient 
investment in infrastructure that in turn contributed to low levels of development.206 
Indeed, some scholars concluded that “the extraordinarily high levels of ethnic diversity 
in Africa” made an important contribution to “Africa’s growth tragedy.”207
The incidence of war and civil strife is 
much greater in the world’s 58 poorest 
countries than in other countries.
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Recent analysis offers a more sophisticated understanding of the links between 
ethnically diverse societies and economic development. These studies found that the 
nature of institutions was an important variable affecting the impact of social divisions. 
In attempting to explain the economic slowdown of so many developing countries 
after 1975, Dani Rodrik found that an important factor was the manner in which 
developing countries managed economic shocks. He observed, “When social divisions 
run deep and the institutions of conflict management are weak, the economic costs 
of exogenous shocks—such as deterioration in the terms of trade—are magnified by 
the distributional conflicts that are triggered.”208 However, economic performance is 
much better when variables for economic inequality and ethnic diversity are combined 
with high quality governmental institutions—based on evaluations for the rule of law, 
bureaucratic quality, corruption, expropriation risk, and governmental repudiation 
of contracts or democracy based with strong political rights and civil liberties. Rodrik 
concludes, “The evidence is strongly suggestive that countries with greater democracy, 
more participatory institutions, stronger rule of law, higher quality governmental 
institutions, and higher levels of social insurance have experienced less economic 
disruption after the mid-70s.”209 Using a similar index for institutional quality, William 
Easterly also found that “sound institutional arrangements” curtail the negative impact 
of ethnic diversity on economic development, eliminating it altogether at the highest 
levels of institutional development.210
In the case of ethnic divisions, as in the case of economic inequality, the impact 
of social relations is complex and contingent. In both instances, the nature of the 
institutional context plays a crucial role in shaping the outcomes of social relations. 
Understanding the consequences of variation in institutions and social relations is 
essential to grasping the consequences of economic inequality and social difference.
VII. Conclusion: Overcoming Persistent Inequalities
Inequality enables powerful actors to shape political and economic institutions to 
reinforce their power at the expense of others and the broader social welfare. The 
process works at international and domestic levels.  Developed countries have shaped 
the politics of global economic governance in ways that have favored their interests to 
the detriment of poor countries. Wealthy countries maintain tariffs that discriminate 
against developing countries and many of the poorest people in the world. 
Liberalization of international labor markets is barely on the agenda even though 
reducing restrictions on the market would benefit rich and poor countries alike. 
Efforts to promote capital account liberalization produced a series of financial crises 
during the 1990s because they failed to take into account the distinctive conditions in 
developing countries, especially the low level of development of their regulatory 
institutions. The WTO agreement on trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 
and the even more restrictive provisions of bilateral and regional trade agreements 
impede poor countries’ access to life-saving medicines and prevents them from reverse 
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engineering and copying technologies, a strategy widely used by today’s wealthy 
countries to catch up to the earlier generation of global leaders.  More generally, the 
WTO’s “single undertaking” approach—obliging countries to abide by the same 
restrictions on developmental policy regardless of their level of development —has 
greatly restricted poor countries’ ability to pursue policies appropriate for their 
particular circumstances.  
Avoiding excessive levels of global inequality is a more important issue today 
than ever before.  Improvements in transportation and communications technologies 
make differences in standards of living increasingly more visible to people throughout 
the world.  Continued technological change will only increase the salience of global 
inequalities.  At the same time that globalization brings people into closer contact, it 
makes them more interdependent.  At a time when high levels of inequality call into 
question the legitimacy of the international institutions, global economic governance 
requires increasing cooperation of all countries, wealthy and poor.  High levels of global 
inequality threaten to undermine the cooperation needed to maximize the benefits of 
global growth.
Persistently elevated levels of inequalities within developing countries have also 
played an important role in shaping their development.  As inequality increases, the 
impact of economic growth on poverty alleviation declines.  Higher levels of inequality 
are associated with greater levels of violent crime.  High levels of inequality diminish the 
poor’s access to public services.  They erode the poor’s property rights and undermine 
the equitable distribution of the benefits of financial markets.  Domestic inequality is an 
important explanation for why inefficient institutions persist since it empowers elites 
to avoid changes that could undermine their position.   In many developing countries, 
politicians have responded to the incentives created by global markets by implementing 
a range of reforms designed to expand the role of markets, increase efficiency, reduce 
inflation, and promote growth. However, in numerous cases they have implemented 
these reforms in a way that accommodated elite interests, protected their core coalition, 
and attempted to attract powerful new coalition partners. All too often, the outcome 
has been increased inequality and reduced economic security.
Though the spread of democracy among developing countries has coincided with 
increased domestic inequalities, this coincidence does not imply causation. Democracy 
has complex consequences for the diverse countries of the developing world, and the 
proliferation of democracy in the last 30 years has been accompanied by diversification of 
democratic experience. Democratic politics offers the promise of better accommodation 
of social difference, an important goal for the diverse societies of the developing world. 
By using the greater social spaces inherent in more democratic political systems, even 
marginal groups have been able to develop organizational networks that facilitate their 
political mobilization and enhance their capacity to make claims on state authorities. 
One consequence has been the articulation of the “postliberal challenge” in which 
heretofore marginalized groups attempt to gain recognition for their different status 
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by augmenting liberal individual rights with group rights and by pressuring for a more 
pluralistic approach to legal systems and political institutions. 
Recent studies suggest that the problems caused by excessive inequality may 
be alleviated by improving the quality of democracy —in particular, by increasing 
voter information to enhance the accountability of political leadership,211 by taking 
measures to expand the share of the electorate that can effectively hold political 
leaders accountable,212 by extending greater political rights to citizens,213 and by 
implementing policies that enhance the economic security and human capital of 
people.214  If excessive inequality may lead to the persistence of inefficient institutions, 
there is evidence that participatory democracy facilitates building good institutions 
by effectively processing local knowledge to construct institutions that contribute to 
higher quality economic growth — growth that is less volatile, better able to adjust to 
shocks, and which produces superior distributional outcomes.215 
One consequence of the inequalities that pervade the international system is 
that the analytical categories and best practices of the powerful are imposed on the 
poor. “For the first time in history,” writes Adam Przeworski, “Capitalism is being 
adopted as an application of a doctrine, rather than evolving as a historical process of 
trial and error.” 216  The same could be said of democracy. Thinking about economic 
and political development in developing countries has taken considerable strides 
since Przeworski et al. made this 
observation some 12 years ago, but the 
“imperialism of categories” that is a 
consequence of power asymmetries 
remains a danger.217 Two of those 
categories, capitalism and democracy, are often offered as a universal prescription 
without reference to the fact that their sequence and form have differed in the 
emergence of the older liberal democracies and will differ among new and emerging 
democracies. Both democracy and capitalism are more likely to flourish if the peoples 
of developing areas can grow such institutions in forms that reflect their histories and 
cultures. Insofar as developed countries are involved in the process of change in 
developing ones, they should be aware of the distinctiveness of conditions in developing 
countries.  Playing a positive role requires listening to and engaging social and political 
goals as formulated by actors within developing countries and then finding ways to 
assist the people in these societies to implement their own solutions. n
Both democracy and capitalism are more likely 
to flourish if the peoples of developing areas 
can grow institutions in forms that reflect their 
histories and cultures.
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Why should we be concerned with inequality in a world where economic growth has created unprecedented abundance? The per capita income of 
the United States is 64 times that of the world’s poorest country, and the income 
of the richest 1% is 415 times the income of the poorest 1%. This report shows 
that these vast inequalities are a persistent problem because they enable powerful 
countries to shape global markets in ways that limit benefits to poor countries, and 
they empower elites in poor countries to resist changes that improve social welfare.
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